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The Salience of Religion as a Social Background 
Variable in Congressional Voting 
RAYMOND T ATALOVICH 
Loyola University of Chicago 
and 
BYRON w. DAYN ES 
DePauw University 
With the pioneering legislative studies of Lowell' in the late 19th and 
early 20th centuries, studies of voting behavior in Congress have become 
increasingly numerous and sophisticated. The major research undertaken 
by Rice, Truman, Turner, MacRae, and Froman 2 indicated that political 
party affiliation is the strongest single determinant of legislative voting 
while constituency acts as a secondary variable. Typically it reinforces party 
voting, but is also can undermine party loyalty when counter-pressures in 
the constituency operate. More recent research by Kingdon, Matthews and 
Stimson, Clausen, and Cherryholmes and Shapiro 1 reveal other important 
variables impinging upon the Congressman's decision-making, for 
examples ideology, party and committee leadership cues, issues, state 
delegations, and representational roles. 
The body of empirical data on legislative voting is impressive, but there 
remains a missing component in the existing literature. The major studies 
do not include explicit reference to social background variables in their 
inventory, and few scholarly articles have focused on this dimension.• 
'A. L. Lowell, "The InOuence of Party Upon Legislation in England and America," 
Annual Report of 1he American Historical Association (1901 ), 321-343. 
' Juliu s Turner, Party and Constituency: Pressures on Congress (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkin s Pre ss, 1951); Duncan Mac Rae, Jr., Dimensions of Congressional Voting (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1958); David Truman, The Congressional Party (New York: 
John Wiley and Sons, 1959); Lewis A. Froman, Jr., Congressmen and Their Constituencies 
(Skokie, Illinoi s: Rand McNally, 1963). 
' John W. Kingdon , Congressmen's Voting Decisions (New York: Harper and Row, 1973); 
Donald R. Matthews and Jame s A. Stimson, Yeas and Nays: Normal Decision-Making in the 
U.S. House of Representatives (New York : John Wiley and Sons, 1975); Aage R. Clause n, 
How Congressmen Decide (New York : St. Martin 's Pre ss, 1973); Cleo H. Cherryholmes and 
Michael J. Shapiro, Representatives and Roll Calls (Indianapolis: The Bobbs -Merill Company, 
1969). 
'Donald R. Matthews, The Social Background of Political Decision-Makers (Garden City, 
New York: Doubleday and Company, 1954); Leroy N . Rieselbach, "Congressmen as 'Small-
Town Boys ': A Research Note," Midwest Journal of Political Science (May, 1970), 321-330 
and "The Demograph y of the Congressional Vote on Foreign Aid, 1938-1958," American 
Political Science Review (1964), 577-588; Donald R. Matthew s, United States Senators and 
Their World (New York: Vintage Books, 1960); David W. Brady, John Schnidhauser, and 
Larry L. Berg, '" Hou se Lawyers and Support for the Supreme Court," The Journal of 
Politics (Augu st, 1973), 724-729. 
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While these studies point that Congressional membership appears 
sociologically atypical of a cross-section of American society, little effort is 
made to point out the obvious implications of this on the representative pro-
cess. Our review of textbooks on American government, s for example, in-
dicates that none mentioned the impact of social background characteristics 
on voting although all noted that social biases affected legislative recruit-
ment. Legislative voting studies seem to give major attention to constituency 
influence at the expense of background variables even though rather large 
Congressional samples would permit rigorous statistical analysis. By con-
trast, students of judicial behavior put their major emphasis on the social 
background of judges 6 while ignoring judicial constituency variables . 
This paper will assess the literature and develop hypotheses concerning 
the probable impact of social background attributes on Congressional 
voting. Toward this end, eight variables were studied : (1) size of residence, 
(2) geographic "mobility," (3) previous elective experience, (4) seniority 
within the House of Representatives, (5) occupation, (6) religion, (7) age, 
(8) region. For purposes of comparison, the analysis will include party 
affiliation as well as four constituency variables (percent urban, percent 
Negro, percent owner-occupied housing, and density) and electoral 
marginality (percent margin of victory). 
All but four variables studied are readily available 1 as numerical 
'Martin Diamond, Winston Mills Fisk, and Herb ert Garfinkel, The Democra1ic Republic 
(Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1971); Kenneth Prewitt and Sidney Verba, An ln -
1roduc1ion to American Government (New York: Harper and Row , 1974); Marian D. Irish, 
James W. Prothro, and Richard J. Richard son, The Poli1ics of American Democracy 
(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice -Hall, 1977); James MacGregor Burns and J. W. Pelta son , Govern-
men1 by !he People (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice -Hall, 1972); Milton C. Cummings, Jr. and 
David Wise, Democracy Under Pressure (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1977); 
Theodore J. Lowi, American Government: Incomple1e Conquesl (Hinsdale, Illinois: The 
Dryden Press, 1976). 
'Among the numerous studies of judicial behavior, see the following: Joel B. Grossman, 
"Social Backgrounds and Judicial Decision-Making," Harvard Law Review (1966) 1551-1564; 
S. Sidney Ulmer, "Dissent Behavior and the Social Background of Supreme Court Ju stices," 
Journal of Politics (1970), 580-598; S. Sidney Ulmer, "Social Background as an Indicator to 
the Votes of Supreme Court Ju stices in Criminal Cases: 1947-1956 Terms" American Journal 
of Political Science (1973), 622-630. 
' Information on party, age, occupation, religion, and seniority is found in the Congres-
sional Quarterly Almanac, 89th Congress, Isl Session, Vol. XXI (Washington: Congressional 
Quarterly Service, 1966), 34-37. The four constituency variables are listed in: United States 
Bureau of the Census, Congressional Disrrict Data Book, 88th Congress (Washington: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, I 963). Birthplace , experience, and size of residence were deter-
mined from: 89th Congress, 1st Session, Official Congressional Direc/Ory (Washington: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1965) and Biographical Directory of the American Congress 
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971 ); U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of 
the Popular ion, 1970, Vol. I, "Characteristics of the Population" (Washington: U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1973). The margin of victory was calculated on the basis of statis tics in: 
Richard M. Scammon, America Votes 6: A Handbook of Contemporary American Election 
Sta1is1ics (Washington: Governmental Affairs Institute, 1966) and Congressional Quarterly, 
Guide 10 U.S. Elections (Washington: Congressional Quarterly, Inc . 1975). 
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values. The exceptions are par ty affiliation, religion, occupation, and 
region, and they were all assigned values for purpo ses of analysis. For 
political party, Democrats were coded 1 and Republicans 0. Congressme n 
were divided into two regional categories; Southerners 8 were coded 0 and 
non-Southerners as 1. For religion, Catholics and Jews were coded 1 and all 
other denominations as 0. And since the literature suggests that, compare d 
to other occupations, lawyers hold a special relationship to the politica l 
system, three classifications of occupations were constructed. Congressmen 
with law as their only occupation were coded 2; those who designated law in 
conjunction with other occupations were coded 1; and those Congressmen 
engaged in non-legal occupations were coded 0. 
As the dependent variable, the index used by Rieselbach, Cherryholmes 
and Shapiro and others-the "federal support score"-is used . This index 
coded any yea or nay vote by a Congressman in favor of greater involve-
ment by the federal government 9 • The 89th Congress (1965-66) was chosen 
for study because of the many important Great Society proposals-civil 
rights, medicare, aid to education. Issues of this magnitude, we felt, would 
bring added meaning to one's vote in favor or against increased federal in-
volvement. Based on selected roll calls from both sessions of the 89th Con-
gress, a range from Oto 23 is created. Only the Hou se of Representatives is 
included in this analysis since its larger member ship is more heterogeneo us 
than the Senate on the many social background variables chosen for study. 
Excluded from the study were ten Representatives without a federal support 
score (FSS). This gave us a workable universe of 425. 
While our major purpose is to determine which social backgroun d 
variables affect voting behavior and to measure their relative impact, the 
direction of each coefficient will indicate which Congressmen are more sup-
portive of an expanded federal role. By applying correlation and regression 
techniques to all variables, moreover, the importance of backgroun d 
variables relative to party, constituency, and electoral marginality can be 
'The South includes the eleven states of the former Confederacy: Alaba ma, Mississippi, 
Nor th Carol ina, Sou th Carolina, Ark ansas, Texas , Louis iana, Virginia, Florida, Tennessee, 
and Georgia. 
'See Congressional Quarterly Alamanac, 89th Congress, 2nd Session , Vol. XXII 
(Washington : Congressional Quarterly Service, 1966), 1008- 1009. The legislation and issues in-
cluded in these roll calls are: daylight savings time, rent suppl ements (2), minimum wage, con -
sumer credit contro l, open housing, civil rights, traffic safe ty, War on Poverty (2), truth in 
pac kaging, Demonstration Cit ies, App alachian Regional Development Act , Elementary and 
Secondary Educat ion Act, Medicare, housi ng departm ent , voting rights, right-to-work , Higher 
Education Act, Natio nal Found ation on the Art s and Hum anities, Clean Air and Water 
Disposal Act, highway beautifi cation , Teacher Corp s. 
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delineated. To guide this study, eight hypotheses based on the theoretical 
arguments and empirical evidence in the literature are provided: 
1. Congressmen who reside in larger communities are more supportive 
of FSS than those who live in smaller communities. 
2. Congressmen who exhibit greater geographic "mobility" are more 
supportive of FSS than those with less mobility. 
3. Congressmen with more "experience" in previous elective office are 
more supportive of FSS than those with less experience. 
4. Congressmen with less "seniority" in the House are more suppor-
tive of FSS than those with more seniority. 
5. Congressmen who are lawyers are more supportive of FSS than 
those who are not lawyers. 
6. Congressmen who are Catholic or Jewish are more supportive of the 
FSS than those who are not. 
7. Congressmen who are younger are more supportive of FSS than 
those who are older. 
8. Congressmen from regions outside the South are more supportive 
of FSS than those from the South. 
Table 1 presents a Pearson correlation coefficient matrix showing the 
inter-relationships among all fifteen variables studied. Most relevant are the 
correlations between each social background variable and the federal sup-
port score. The correlation between FSS voting and occupation, however, is 
insignificant. The other seven are significant, and five are significant at very 
high levels (p = .0001). Moreover, our hypotheses are sustained by the cor-
relations between FSS voting and age, religion, mobility, region, and size of 
residence. The data indicates, however that our assumptions about the im-
pact of seniority and experience require re-examination. 
TABLE 1 
'° N 
Pearson Inter-Correlation Matrix of Fifteen Variables Studied 
--
g. 
t ~ s:: 
'o> ~ ., -~ s:: 0 0 s:: <.; C)"" 
.:; -~ ·;:: C 
'o>~ 0 .::: b i - <.; -~ i.!..5 ... -~ 1: V) s:: 0 s:: ~ ·;;; ~n~ §- ., -~ Variables ~ c:, ~ ~~ s:: C ., . ... ., ~-tl -e:, I s:: <.; ~ §- ti "" ;l:: C ~~ ., ~ ~ ., ::3 ., <.; ~ f:') 
"' 
~ V)~ Q C) ::i:: C) i.: V) ~ 
Party XXX .o35 .188 .165 .083 .272 . 169 - .300 .023 .089 .381 .553 .093 .586 - .181 
Age .035 XXX - .061 .128 - .006 .159 .062 - . 124 - .054 .698 .244 - .501 -. 053 - .098 - .069 
Religion .188 - .061 XXX .218 .352 - .121 .254 - .199 - .028 -. 059 -. 007 .202 - .019 .456 .290 
Size of Residence . 165 .128 .218 XXX .432 .244 .790 - .609 - .01 I .097 .176 .031 .066 .269 .149 
Urban .083 - .006 .352 .432 XXX .057 .428 - .371 - .041 - .081 .066 .069 . 131 .398 .305 
Negro .272 .159 - .121 .244 .057 XXX .258 -. 442 .054 . 196 .509 - .020 - .047 - .125 -. 338 
Density .169 .062 .254 .790 .428 .258 XXX - .741 .008 .033 .244 .042 - .019 .289 . 188 
Owner-Occupied 
Housing -. 300 -. 124 -. 199 -. 609 -. 371 - .442 - .741 XXX - .036 - .093 - .403 -. 087 .027 - .256 - .037 
Occupation .023 - .054 - .028 - .01 I -. 041 .054 .008 - .036 XXX . 104 .043 -. 031 .055 - .064 - .120 
"Experience" .089 .698 - .059 .097 - .081 .196 .033 -. 093 .104 XXX .359 -. 577 - .o38 -. 140 -. 169 
Margin of Victory .381 .244 - .007 . 176 .066 .509 .244 - .403 .043 .359 XXX - .135 -. 048 .015 - .281 
"Seniority" .553 - .501 .202 .031 .069 - .020 .042 - .087 - .031 - .577 - .135 XXX .094 .488 .024 
"Mobility" .093 - .053 - .019 .066 .131 -. 047 -. 020 .027 .055 -. 038 -. 048 .094 XXX .too .042 
Federal Support 
Score .586 - .098 .456 .269 .398 - .125 .289 - .256 - .064 - .140 .015 .488 .JOO XXX .319 
Region - .181 - .069 .290 .149 .305 - .338 .188 -. 037 - .120 -. 169 -. 281 .024 .042 .319 XXX 
Within this table, any correlation with a value of .081 is significant at the .05 level. A value of. 104 is significant at the .01 level; a 
value of .149 is significant at the .001 level; and a value of . I 76 is significant at the .0001 level. 
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Size of residence and geographic "mobility" both address the question 
of parochialism in the recruitment of legislative elites. In his well-known 
study, Andrew Hacker 10 indicated that Senators were more parochial than 
corporate executives in their backgrounds, and he hinted that such limited 
experiences may hinder legislators in being able to understand the complex-
ities of our economy. Rieselbach tried to determine whether Congressmen 
as "small town boys" voted differently than their more urban 
counterparts. 11 To gauge parochialism, he used three indices: size of birth-
place, size of residence, and geographic mobility. He found that Represen-
tatives born in smaller towns and from smaller residences were less suppor-
tive of FSS voting, but there seemed to be no relationship to mobility. Our 
data affirms this line of reasoning, vis., FSS voting is correlated to larger 
residences and to greater geographic mobility. 
The variables of age, occupation, and religion were given some atten-
tion by Donald Matthews. 12 His study of the 81st Congress indicated that 
liberal Senators tend proportionately to be younger rather than older, to be 
Catholic rather than Protestant, and to be professionals rather than 
businessmen. 
With regard to age, it can be argued that younger legislators are less 
committed to traditional ideology and, over time, more amenable to the 
changing agenda of issues. Presumably, these Congressmen would not 
generally represent "safe" districts controlled by conservative interests. 
Research by Duncan MacRae, Jr. 13 shows that age can displace the impact 
of social status. He found that Massachusetts legislators who were younger 
were under more cross-pressures than older ones and were less loyal to their 
social status as a cue to voting on issues. Our data also shows that younger 
Representatives are more supportive of FSS voting, but the correlation is 
weak and barely significant. 
That lawyers dominate American politics at all levels is readily ap-
parent, and arguments are advanced in the literature which indicate that this 
occupation is functional to the operation of the political system." Unlike 
'°Andrew Hacker, "The Elected and the Annointed: Two Ameri can Elites," American 
Political Science Review (September, 1961), 539-549. 
" Leroy N. Rieselbach , "Congressmen as 'Sma ll-Town Boys': A Researc h note,: op. cit. 
" Donald R. Matthews, The Social Background of Political Decision-Make rs, op. cit. 
" Duncan MacRae, Jr., and Edith K. MacRae, "Legislators' Social Status and Their 
Votes," American Journal of Sociology (May, 1969), 599-603. 
"For examp les see: Hein z Eulau and John D. Sprague, Lawyers in Politics: A Study of 
Professional Convergence (Indianapolis: The Bobb s-Merrill Company, 1964); Joseph A. 
Schlesinger, "Lawyers and American Politic s: A Clarified View," Midwest Journal of 
Political Science (1957), 26-39; P . L. Hain, "Lawyers and Politic s Revisited-Structural Ad-
vantages," American Journal of Political Science (February, 1975), 41-51. 
94 
businessmen, lawyers are trained and socialized-the argument goes-in 
the process of negotiation and compromise. To this extent, they may be 
more flexible on the issues and less likely to react to policy from a fixed 
ideological position. The relationship between occupation and FSS voting, 
as formulated in this analysis, is not significant; however, its direction in-
dicated greater FSS voting by non-lawyer Congressmen. 
The voting tendencies of Jewish and Catholic Representatives are 
similarly liberal, indicative of their ethnic origins. One public opinion 
study, for example, showed Jews and Catholics to be more "liberal" than 
Protestants with regard to government's role in the society. '5 Our data con-
firms this expectation. A strong correlation exists between religion and FSS 
voting and it seems to exist independently of other variables. While most 
Catholics and Jews are Democrats, 16 there are fewer Democrats in Congress 
who are Catholic or Jewish (thus the weak correlation between party and 
religion, .188). Not surprisingly, most Catholics and Jews are from outside 
the South, but the vast majority of non-Southern Congressmen are not 
Catholic or Jewish. The correlation between religion and region, as a conse-
quence, is only a modest .290. Furthermore, by calculating partial co-
efficients, it is determined that the impact of religion on FSS voting is sus-
tained after controlling for party (.436), for seniority (.386), and for urban 
variables (.363). Among all social background variables, only religion acts 
independently of other factors. 
The distinctive impact of region on American politics has long been 
recognized. This has been particularly true of the South. Most Congres-
sional voting studies impose controls for region. One of the well-known 
Congressional voting blocs-the ''conservative coalition'' -takes account 
of the importance of region. Southern conservatism is rooted in the Civil 
War era, in the rural plantation economy and its "peculiar" institution of 
slavery. It is sustained today by a new-found affluence caused by late in-
dustrialization and economic development. Among social background at-
tributes, our study showed region to be fourth strongest, but highly inter-
related to constituency variables (urban and Negro). 
As measures of "professionalism" one's experience in previous elective 
office and seniority within the House are used. The literature suggests that 
" Wesley and Beverly Allinsmith, "Religious Affiliation and Politico-Economic 
Attitudes," Public Opinion Quarterly (Fall, 1948), 377-389. 
06Among the Congressmen in the 89th Congress, religious denominations are 
represented in the following proportions in the Democratic Party: Jewish-93.3; 




these variables might have differential impact. The assertion is made that 
elites with greater experience in elective office-unlike amateurs-are less 
ideological, more willing to compromise, and are more loyal to party 
leadership. 11 Following this line of reasoning, greater elective experience 
should aid FSS voting. The same could be said of seniority within Congress, 
yet evidence to the contrary would suggest that very senior Represen-
tatives-committee chairmen-tend to come from safe, homogeneous and 
conservatively oriented districts . 18 However, it should be mentioned that 
even should all twenty-one standing committee chairmen be very con ser-
vative, their roll call voting record would be minor in our univer se of 425 
Representatives. As indicated by the correlations, experience is negatively 
related to FSS voting. But how is this disparity explained? The intercorrela-
tion matrix shows experience, senority, and age to be strongly interrelated. 
Age correlates to experience (.698) but to less seniority ( - .501). The reverse 
situation affects FSS voting; that is, voting for FSS correlates to younger 
age, to less prior experience, and to more seniority. What these linkages 
suggest is that FSS voting is aided by Congressmen who typically enter the 
Hou se at a younger age, without having had much previou s elective ex-
perience, and who , subsequently, are able to accumulate greater seniority 
within the Congress. It would appear, therefore, that argument s against the 
seniority system affecting committee assignments have less validity when 
applied to the operation of the legislative system as a whole. To the extent 
that seniority introduces '"profes sionalism'' into the law-making proce ss, it 
aids voting for an expanded federal role. And there are suggestions in the 
data that previous experience may be less relevant to the legislative proces s 
than ongoing experience in the Congress. 
Seniority is the strongest social background variable (.488), but it ap-
pear s to be a function of party affiliation. That is, when a partial correla-
tion is calculated with controls for party, the correlation between seniority 
and FSS voting is reduced to .243. 
Overall, the four strongest correlates of FSS voting are: party affilia-
tion, seniority , religion, and percent urban. The literature confirm s that 
party is most important; however, social background attribute s appear 
" See James Q. Wilson, The Amateur Democrat (Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 
1966). C. Richard Hofs tette r gives some empirical support to Wilson 's argument in " The 
Amate ur Politican : A Probl em in Construct Validatio n," M idwest Journal of Political Science 
(Februa ry, 1971), 31-57. 
"George Goo dwin , Jr. , " The Senio rity System in Congress," A merican Political Science 
Review (Jun e, 1959), 412-436. For an argument suggesting that committee chairmen tend to 
mirror party strength and ideology, see Barbara Hinckley, The Seniority System Congress 
(Bloomington Indiana University Press, I 971 ), especia lly chapte r 8. 
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stronger than constituency variables. Table 2 gives the multiple regression 
model based on these strongest predictors. Taken together, party, seniority, 
religion, and urbanism explain 54.9 percent of the variance in FSS voting. 
Independently, party explains 33.9 percent, religion adds 12.4 percent, 
urban accounts for 6.3 percent, and-as expected-seniority adds only 2.3 
percent to the total variance predicted. 
The salience of religion as a social background variable is confirmed, 
even though it is based on an uncomplicated dichotomy between 
Jewish / Catholic Representatives and all others. The "liberalism" of Jewish 
and Catholic Congressmen cannot be explained in terms of the economic 
condition or the social class of all Jews and Catholics since the position of 
Jews generally exceeds that of Catholics. One answer may lie in the history 
of discrimination suffered by both groups in America. '9 The threat of anti-
Semitism and the tenents of the Jewish faith may foster liberalism in Jewish 
Congressmen. The struggle of immigrant groups-like the Catholics-in 
their quest for social mobility led many of them to enter the trade union 
movement and to capitalize on the paternalism of big city political 
machines. From this perspective, Jewish and Catholic Representatives may 
be more supportive of governmental intervention to aid minorities and to 
limit the privileges of established elites. To this extent, it would appear that 
the nature of the belief systems of organized religion as weJI as the differen-
tial attraction of ethnic groups to certain religious denominations has an af-
fect on voting behavior. In this light, moreover, arguments which 
underestimate the "symbolic" or sociological importance of group 
representation in Congress and stress only geographical representation may 
need restructuring. Members of specific religious denominations may 
transmit independent perceptions of issues, individual approaches to 
problem-solving, and create new demands on Congress in behalf of their 
clientele groups. 20 
"See the chapter which analyze the political inclinations of Jews, Irish, Slavs, and Italians 
in Mark R. Levy and Michael S. Kramer, The Ethnic Factor (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
1973). 
'°For example, see Leroy N. Rieselbach, "The Demograph y of the Congressional Vote on 
Foreign Aid, 1939-1958," op. cit. Among the personal attributes he studied, only religion 
strongly related to voting on foreign aid. Catholics were more supportive of foreign aid, and 
Rieselbach suggests that "suc h programs may have appeared to Catholics as a means to assist 
their homelands in time of economic crisis." Other discussions of this issue are found in: 
Bernard Fensterwald, Jr ., "The Anatomy of American 'Isolationism' and Expansionism," 
Journal Conflict Resolution June and December, 1958), 111-138 and 280-309; John H. Fen-
ton, The Catholic Vote (New Orleans: Hauser Press, 1960), 87-108. 
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TABLE 2 
Multiple Regression Model Showing Impact of Party , Religion, Urbanism, 
and Seniority on Voting the Federal Support Score 
Independent Multiple R RSq Simple F 
Variables R Square Change R B Beta Value 
Party .58259 .33942 .33942 .58259 6.467109 .41531 108.623 
Religion .68063 .46325 . 12384 .45465 3.688582 .24657 46.486 
Urban .72544 .52626 .06300 .40195 .7926693 .26826 57.384 
Seniorit y .74093 .54897 .02272 .47964 .5687984 . 18157 20.650 
(con stant) .6933314 
This research suggests that social background variables can affect 
voting behavior and that religion deserves to be studied as an independent 
variable of importance. Its operation does not depend upon issue-specific 
voting but rather affects voting behavior on numerous domestic, social 
welfare issues associated with increased role of the federal government in 
our economy and society. 
